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 ABSTRACT 
Although the resettlement of refugees is always politically contentious in host countries, 
the current global refugee crisis has only magnified those contentions.  In the United States and 
in many European countries there has been a strong backlash against the resettlement of refugees 
particularly those from Muslim majority countries.  However, within countries such as the U.S. 
there are areas of the country that are more anti-refugee than others.  The purpose of this paper is 
to explore the variation in refugee resettlement across the fifty U.S. states from 2002-2010.  
Refugee resettlement in the U.S. is done in conjunction with the federal government, religious 
and secular non-profits, and state governments.  Some states are far more hospitable to refugee 
resettlement than others and this paper explores the political, economic and social factors that 
influence the number of refugees resettled in each state.  We find that states with a moralistic 
political culture resettle the most refugees but more liberal states do not resettle more refugees 
than conservative states.  Also, states with a better quality of life resettle more refugees but so do 
states with higher poverty rates. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On November 13, 2015, eight European nationals in Paris bombed a national stadium 
during a football match, attacked civilians in a theater, and shot patrons in nearby cafes and 
restaurants killing 130 people and injuring 413 (Tharoor, 2015). One of the attackers killed by 
law enforcement officers was found with a passport linked to a Syrian refugee recently admitted 
into the European Union (Tharoor, 2015). In response to the Paris attacks, many U.S. states 
urged limiting Syrian refugee placements, called for an immediate suspension of the refugee 
program, and initiated state action to curtail refugee placements within their territories (Elias, 
2017; Seipel 2015; Tau & Peterson, 2015). Twenty-Nine Republicans and one Democratic 
governor (Maggie Hassan of New Hampshire) objected to the admission of refugees without an 
enhanced screening process. Shortly thereafter, the Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”) 
released a letter admonishing the U.S. states that they “may not categorically deny ORR-funded 
benefits and services to Syrian refugees” (Fandl, 2017, p. 84).   
Several state legislators specifically introduced bills attempting to grant states the right to 
reject placement of refugees within their borders. Congressman Rick Crawford (R-AR) 
introduced a bill allowing “any state, through its governor, to reject the placement of refugees 
within its borders (Refugee Relocation Security Act, 2015). Senator Ted Cruz introduced a bill in 
Congress seeking to amend the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) to allow state 
rejection of refugee resettlement if the Governor certifies to the Director of the ORR that the 
Director has “failed…to provide adequate assurance that the alien does not present a security risk 
to the State” (State Refugee Security Act, 2015). Tennessee passed a law allowing it to sue the 
federal government to prevent the resettlement of any refugee within its territory (S.J.R., 2015). 
Texas sued the federal government to block the placement of a Syrian family, arguing that the 
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state was not adequately consulted nor provided enough background information on the 
placement (Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n v. United States, 2015). Finally, then Governor 
of Indiana and current Vice President Mike Pence tried to prevent state money from going to a 
private organization, Exodus Refugee Immigration, which had a contract with the state of 
Indiana for resettling refugees (Exodus Refugee v. Pence, 2016).   
 The hostile actions of Republican governors to the resettlement of refugees in their states 
raises a more fundamental question of what factors explain the resettlement of refugees within 
the U.S. states?  Refugee resettlement occurs in all 50 states in the U.S. and Washington D.C. 
with the exception of Wyoming.  The process of resettling refugees in the United States is shared 
between the federal government and nonprofit voluntary agencies (“VOLAGS”).  State 
governments play a secondary role in the resettlement of refugees with some more supportive of 
the process and working in tandem with the federal government and the VOLAGS while others 
are more hostile to the process and provide minimal support, if any at all, for the resettlement of 
refugees within their borders. This paper explores how hospitable or inhospitable U.S. states are 
to refugee resettlement with the hope of explaining the pattern of refugee resettlement within the 
U.S.    
 The rest of the paper will proceed as follows.  The next section will detail the U.S. 
refugee resettlement process.  Specifically, it will address how the various federal agencies 
interact and work with the VOLAGS (both national and local) which together comprise the 
resettlement process in the U.S.  The following section will explore various theoretical 
explanations for the refugee resettlement patterns in the U.S. focusing on state politics, state 
economic capacity, and the religious composition along with the level of volunteerism within the 
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states.  The succeeding two sections will contain the hypotheses, data description, and 
methodology.  This will be followed by the results section and finally the conclusion. 
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 The refugee process in the U.S. is governed by the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 
1965 (“INA”) and the Refugee Act of 1980.1 The 1980 Refugee Act modified the INA by: (1) 
providing federal funding for the placement of refugees within local communities; (2) creating 
the ORR to coordinate the disbursement of federal funds to the states; and, (3) providing 
transitional funding for the first 18 months of placement and a three-year limit on reimbursable 
expenses by states (Elias, 2017; Fandl, 2017). Under the 1980 Refugee Act, the President 
determines how many refugees will be admitted to the United States each year (Elias, 2017; 
Fandl, 2017; Pritchett, 2017). From 2013 to 2015, the ceiling was set annually at 70,000 but after 
the Syrian refugee crisis, President Obama increased the quota to 85,000, including 10,000 
refugees from Syria for the 2016 fiscal year (Memorandum from Office of the Press Secretary to 
the Secretary of State, 2016).  Conversely, the Trump administration has shown outright hostility 
to the resettlement of refugees in the United States not only with several iterations of the travel 
ban prohibiting people from certain countries (refugees or not) from entering the country but also 
by the fact that the administration is slow-walking refugee admissions—the U.S. admitted only 
20,000 refugees for the fiscal year 2018 which is well below the 85,000 resettled in the last fiscal 
year of the Obama administration (Solis and Limon 2018).  
                                                          
1The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) defines refugee for domestic law purposes as: “Any person 
who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside 
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable 
or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded 
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.” 
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The resettlement process is complex and involves international organizations, multiple 
federal government agencies, national and local volunteer organizations both secular and 
religious, and the variable contributions of state government agencies.  Refugee applicants are 
initially screened and referred to the U.S. by either of three agencies— the international 
organization United Nations High Commission for Refugees (“UNHCR”), a U.S. embassy, or a 
nongovernmental organization (Carey, 2015; Elias, 2017; Fandl, 2017). The U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) conducts extensive interviews, background checks, and 
medical screenings of refugees assigned for relocation to the U.S. (Immigration and Nationality 
Act, 2016; Pope, 2015).  Upon admission to the U.S., refugees are assigned to one of the nine 
resettlement VOLAGS operating in the U.S.2 (Elias, 2017; Forrest & Brown, 2014; Kenny and 
Lockwood-Kenny, 2011; Zucker, 1982) which then coordinates with local affiliates and state 
agencies to find appropriate placements within local communities (Capps, et al., 2015; Fandl, 
2017; Mott, 2010; Wright, 1981; Zucker 1983). The VOLAG notifies a local community-based 
organization of the pending refugee arrival (Darrow, 2015; Fandle, 2017). The local organization 
receives a payment from the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (“PRM”) to arrange 
“housing, furnishings, food, and clothing” for the refugee (Xi, 2017, p. 1205). Upon arrival of 
the refugee, the local organization receives funds from the PRM but administered through the 
state’s VOLAG to “help the refugee obtain employment, receive medical care, and learn 
English” (Fandle, 2017, p. 94). 
                                                          
2These 9 VOLAGS are: (1) Church World Service; (2) Episcopal Migration Ministries; (3) Ethiopian Community 
Development Council; (4) Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society; (5) International Rescue Committee; (6)  Lutheran 
Immigration and Refugee Service; (7) U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants; (8) United States Conference 
of Catholic Bishops (Catholic Charities); and (9) World Relief.   
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The federal government compensates states for the initial costs of refugee placement 
within their communities (Kennedy, 1981). There are four types of federal refugee resettlement 
program implemented in the U.S. states: (1) state administered where thirty-two states 
voluntarily receive federal funds to administer their own ORR-approved State Refugee 
Resettlement Programs; (2) federally funded public-private partnerships where the states 
“maintain policy and administrative oversight” but VOLAG locals provide “direct services to the 
refugees;”3 (3) Wilson-Fish programs that emphasize “early employment and economic self-
sufficiency” through incentive bonuses for “early employment” and are implemented in twelve 
states that withdrew from the federal program—VOLAGS and other nonprofits within these 
states function as “state-designees” to provide “support for refugees;”4 and, (4) no refugee 
resettlement program whatsoever5 (Elias, 2017, pp. 374-375; Pritchett, 2017, pp. 290-293; Xi, 
2017, p. 1207).  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK UNDERLYING THE REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT 
PROCESS 
Immigration Federalism and State Role  
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence is replete with cases affirming the preeminence of the 
federal government over state and local governments with respect to immigration issues 
(Bulman-Pozen and Gerken, 2009; Fandl, 2015). Although jurisdiction over immigration matters 
is traditionally reserved to the nation state, subnational and local governments play an increasing 
role in controlling or integrating immigrants into local communities (Gulasekaram and 
                                                          
3Federally public-private partnerships operate in Maryland, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Texas. 
4Wilson-Fish programs are in place in Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, 
Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Vermont. 
5Wyoming has no refugee resettlement program. 
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Ramakrishnan, 2012; Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan, 2013). Varsanyi (2010) explains that 
local jurisdictions influence immigration by creating policies that are either integrative 
(“immigrant policies”) or restrictive (“immigration policies”). These policies can be classified 
into: (1) policies arising from devolution of integration from federal to local governments (e.g., 
devolution to states of power to determine eligibility for welfare programs); (2) policies arising 
from devolution of control from central to local governments (e.g., annual immigration quotas 
and local immigration policing); (3) integrative immigrant policies arising from grassroots (e.g., 
housing, employment, local welfare); and (4) immigration control policies arising from the 
grassroots (e.g. penalizing local employers and landlords who hire or rent housing to 
undocumented residents).  
In the U.S., states and local jurisdictions have developed policies that are either 
integrative, enabling the adaption and assimilation of immigrants and undocumented residents, 
or promote immigration control to exclude and constrain the rights of undocumented residents 
(Varsanyi, 2010).  An example of an immigrant integrative policy caused by devolution is the 
1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”) that 
gives states the powers to determine eligibility for welfare programs, such as the Temporary Aid 
for Needy Families (“TANF” or cash assistance), food stamps, Supplemental Security Income, 
and nonemergency Medicaid. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act is an 
immigration control policy caused by devolution. It gives local police the authority to arrest 
previously deported noncitizen felons. Grassroots immigrant integration policies include: (1) 
education policies extending in-state tuition rates to undocumented students who can 
demonstrate state residency; (2) sanctuary cities and limited cooperation ordinances affirming 
that local authorities will not report the immigration status of those seeking local services to 
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federal immigration authorities; and, (3) grant of voting rights at the local and state level, 
including permitting noncitizens to vote in local school board elections. Grassroots immigration 
control policies include: (1) education policies restricting undocumented citizens from in-state 
tuition rates; (2) criminalizing the hiring of undocumented workers; (3) prohibiting the use by 
undocumented residents of a state issued driver’s license as a valid form of identification to open 
bank accounts, rent apartments, and board planes; (3) various local ordinances on housing, 
trespassing, anti-solicitation; and, (4) restricting access of undocumented residents to state-
funded services.  
In the context of refugee resettlement as a subfield of the U.S. immigration policy, some 
legal scholars have advocated for the states to take a more assertive role by identifying in 
advance locations where refugees and groups of refugees would be accepted and useful (Elias, 
2017; Rodriguez, 2008; Xi, 2017). Johnson (2017, p. 229), however, counters that “allowing 
states to pick and choose among admitted refugees opens the door to local decision-making” 
based, among others, on “race, religion, education, gender, and sexual orientation.” She argues 
instead that the U.S. refugee resettlement process is not based on the premise that the refugee 
could potentially contribute to the state but because “it is the right thing to do,” “refugees are in 
need,” contiguous nations that offered shelter are “overwhelmed by the demand” and because 
“we aspire to be a country that carries its share of global burdens” (Johnson, 2017, p. 229).  
Despite the dominant role of the Federal government in the resettlement process, there is 
thus more than ample room for states to influence the process.  States can make themselves more 
or less hospitable to refugee resettlement through a variety of actions and policies that either 
allow refugees to integrate into the local community or constrain their rights, preventing 
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assimilation.  Our next section looks at how the VOLAGS may consider the hospitableness of a 
state or locality to refugees as criteria for resettlement. 
Organizational Decision-Making: The Role of VOLAGS 
The role of VOLAGS in U.S. immigration started as early as World War II (Forrest & 
Brown, 2014, p. 13; Harrell-Bond 1985; Winkler 1981). As a consequence of Jewish persecution 
in Russia and Eastern Europe during the Holocaust, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society founded 
in 1881 relocated many Jewish survivors to the Midwest and East Coast (Morawska, 1995; U.N. 
Refugee Agency, 2011). Other religious organizations were subsequently created to assist in 
refugee resettlement (Forrest & Brown, 2014; Wright, 1981).6 These religious organizations later 
became institutionalized in the U.S. refugee resettlement process as the intermediaries between 
admission to the United States and local resettlement (Brown, Mott, & Malecki, 2007; Forrest & 
Brown, 2014; Zucker, 1983). 
Successful resettlement within the U.S. depends on the ability of VOLAGS to find 
community based resources such as “local sponsors, financial support, human assistance, 
community cooperation, and/or cooperative local agencies” (Forrest & Brown, 2014, p. 17).  
VOLAGS coordinate with local organizations that can: (1)  provide specific resources such as 
language-services programs and economic opportunities for the refugee; (2) maximize use of 
local private resources such as “ethnic and community organizations;” and, (3) provide necessary 
services such as “case management, medical treatment, language training, housing placement” 
(Forrest & Brown, 2014, p. 16).  Therefore, a critical factor in refugee resettlement is the “long-
                                                          
6Examples of these religious organizations include: (1) American Committee for Christian German Refugees (1934); 
(2) Catholic Committee for Refugee Victims of Nazi Persecution (1936); (3) American Fund for Czechoslovak 
Relief, the Tolstoy Foundation, and the Polish American Immigration and Refugee Committee (after World War II); 
(4) American Council for Nationalities Service and the World Relief Organization, an associate of the National 
Association of Evangelicals (1975); and, (5) Young Men’s Christian Association (1979).  
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standing institutional relationships between national VOLAGS and local agencies” (Forrest & 
Brown, 2014, p. 18).7  Local organizations provide two essential services for refugees —help in 
securing affordable housing (Darrow, 2015a) and economic opportunities (Darrow, 2015b).  
Since the majority of federal funding for the resettlement process is for employment support, 
VOLAGS and local organizations also spend a significant amount of their time supporting 
refugees in their search for employment (Darrow 2015b).  
In addition to the relationships VOLAGS have with local affiliates and organizations, and 
the services those groups provide, they are also mindful of the role social and ethnic ties can play 
in the successful resettlement of refugees.  Placement in communities with high concentrations 
of same-ethnic groups can have a positive impact on integration of the newly settled refugees 
(Bolt, Özüekren, & Phillips, 2009; Sherrell, D'Addario & Hiebert, 2007; Spicer, 2008) through 
assistance with cultural transition into the new community (Ives, 2007; Miyares, 2010) and help 
with economic opportunities (Haines, 1996; Kibria, 1994; Mamgain & Collins, 2003; Murdie & 
Ghosh, 2009; Portes & Rumbaut, 2006; Portes & Stepick, 1985). However, spatial concentration 
can also negatively impact resources of the community because of the potential to overwhelm 
local resources and capacity (Leibowitz, 1983; Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2002). In their study 
of the urban geography of resettlement patterns of refugees, Brown, Mott, & Malecki (2007, p. 
57) found three mechanisms as influential: “distance decay” where refugees tended to resettle in 
localities near the immigrant group’s origin location; “migration chains” where they are resettled 
near earlier groups of immigrants of the same or similar ethnic group; and, “intermediary actors” 
                                                          
7Among the states that resettled the highest number of refugees per capita, for instance: (1) North Dakota sponsored 
European refugees since the 1940s and Asians since the 1970s through local branches of Lutheran Social Services; 
(2) Idaho has resettled the Indochinese since the 1970s through the Agency for New Americans, an arm of Episcopal 
Migration Ministries; and (3) New Hampshire Catholic Charities has since 1980 coordinated with the Vermont 
Refugee Resettlement Program, a field office for the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants.  
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where nonprofit agencies such as VOLAGS and local affiliates of resettlement agencies direct 
refugees to particular places.  Beaman (2012) examined refugee placements by the International 
Rescue Committee (“IRC”), finding that once a city was established as a site for refugees from a 
particular place that city will continue to resettle refugees from that same place although the 
numbers decline over time.  VOLAGS are thus cognizant of placing refugees of the same 
nationality or ethnicity in the same areas to the extent they can. 
Finally, other more general factors for resettlement considered by VOLAGS include 
“government policy, resource availability, and willingness in a particular community or 
availability of sponsor agencies or groups” (Forrest & Brown, 2014, p. 16).  VOLAGS also take 
into consideration the political and social environment of a locality when determining the 
placement of refugees.  In summary, there are numerous factors that enter into the organizational 
decision-making process of the VOLAGS. Along with longstanding ties to local organizations, 
the availability of economic opportunities and resources (Forrest & Brown, 2014), social 
networks, and economic conditions (Mott, 2010) appear to be the most important factors for 
VOLAGS when determining where to resettle refugees.  
Partisanship, Political Culture, and Local Capacity 
Studies indicate the relationship between partisanship and political ideology and 
openness to refugee resettlement. A recent study by the Pew Research Center found a sharp 
partisan and ideological divide in support for refugee resettlement—74% of Democrats said the 
U.S. had a responsibility to accept refugees in contrast to only 26% of Republicans (Hartig, 
2018). Almost all the Governors who expressed reservations about the resettlement of Syrian 
refugees in their state were Republicans. Political culture may also play a significant role in 
refugee resettlement because it influences perceptions of and expectations from government 
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(Elazar, 1984; Fisher, 2016). The U.S. national political culture is an aggregate of three political 
subcultures that are widespread and pervasive in different parts of the country: moralistic, 
individualistic, and traditionalistic (Elazar, 1984; Mead, 2004). Each political subculture is 
strongly tied to specific areas, reflecting the patterns of immigration and migration of people of 
different ethnic origins, backgrounds, and religions across the country (Elazar, 1984; Fisher, 
2016; Mead, 2004).  
The moralistic political culture stresses the conception of the commonwealth as the basis 
for democratic government. Politics is viewed as “one of the greatest activities of humanity in its 
search for the good society” and government functions for the “betterment of the 
commonwealth” (Elazar, 1984, p. 117). Politics is centered on the “notion of the public good” 
and devoted to the “advancement of the public interest” (Elazar, 1984, p. 117).  The 
individualistic political culture conceives politics as a marketplace and perceives the government 
as strictly utilitarian. The government does not need to be directly concerned “with questions of 
the good of society” but should handle only those functions demanded by their constituents 
(Elazar, 1984, p. 115). The utilitarian view of politics espouses limited community intervention 
in private activities and restricts government action to only primarily economic areas that 
promote private initiative. Finally, the traditionalistic political culture reflects a pre-commercial 
attitude that is paternalistic, elitist, and hierarchical (Elazar, 1984). Government functions to 
preserve the existing social order and political activities are limited to elites who claim 
legitimacy based on family ties or social position. New programs are initiated only if they serve 
the interest of the governing elite. Political culture is distinct from political ideology—states with 
any of the three political subcultures can be either liberal or conservative or a mixture of both 
(Fisher, 2016). Both Utah and Minnesota, for example, are moralistic states but Utah is 
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considered a conservative Republican state while Minnesota has consistently been Democratic in 
its politics (Elazar, 1984). 
Elazar’s typology of political culture is “as relevant as ever in understanding American 
politics” (Fisher, 2016, p. 88). Fisher (2016), for instance, found significant differences in public 
policy preferences among the different subcultures. Among others, he found that individualistic 
states are most likely to favor reduction of immigration levels while moralistic states are least 
likely to support reduction of immigration (Fisher, 2016). Dincer and Johnston (2016) similarly 
found that political subculture remained relevant in contemporary American politics. Their study 
indicated, for instance, that: (1) political culture accounted for more than a quarter of the 
variance in prevalence of corruptions issues across all states; (2) moralistic states exhibited the 
least corruption issues; and, (3) traditionalistic states had more corruption issues than 
individualistic states (Dincer and Johnston, 2016).  
Mead (2004) examined the link between political culture and local state capacity. His 
study on state implementation of welfare reform and the TANF measured several indicators of 
successful performance: (1) political performance consisted of indicators measuring 
policymaking, consensus and availability of resources; (2) administrative performance consisted 
of indicators measuring commitment, coordination, and capability. Mead (2014) found that 
moralistic states were the most successful at satisfying the performance criteria, followed by 
individualistic states, and traditionalistic states scoring last. Moralistic states scored particularly 
high in measures of consensus and commitment. Moralistic states “were able to form a majority 
behind reform that stretched behind the legislature” and resolved differences with advocates 
“who questioned reform” (Mead, 2014, p. 282). Also, administrative bureaucracy in moralistic 
states were “fully engaged in reform,” accepting the goals as their own (Mead, 2014, p. 282). 
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Mead (2014, p. 285) also ran several regression models on state welfare reform, finding that 
“moralistic states score 2.7 points higher, and individualistic states 1.6 points higher, than the 
average of the traditionalistic states.” Although not directly related to refugee resettlement, his 
study demonstrates the strong association between political culture and state or local capacity. 
Moralistic states achieved higher degree of consensus among various interest and advocacy 
groups and showed greater commitment of bureaucracy in implementing welfare programs at the 
state level.   
Aside from political culture, state capacity for refugee resettlement is dependent on the 
VOLAGS’ linkages and networks with “local ethnic groups” and “local ecumenical groups” and 
these groups’ capacity, resources, and location (Forrest & Brown, 2014, p. 17). State capacity to 
resettle refugees depends on local support systems such as local volunteer agencies and 
organizations contracted by the VOLAGS to facilitate the resettlement process. Local capacity 
also consists of support from state governments (primarily financial) and broader acceptance of 
refugees by the local communities and statewide. As mentioned, political culture may similarly 
be associated with state capacity for refugee resettlement. Moralistic states may achieve greater 
consensus among local organizations and volunteers in resettling refugees and higher 
commitment from state bureaucracy in implementing policies that enable integration of refugees. 
Theory of State Refugee Resettlement – Hospitable States and Inhospitable States 
To summarize, the existing literature provides valuable insights into the refugee 
resettlement process. First, although refugee resettlement is a federal concern, states are 
expected to implement refugee resettlement policies through coordinating with federal 
government agencies and VOLAGS. Second, placement of refugees is largely dependent on local 
state capacities, including economic opportunities and the presence of local ecumenical or 
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secular affiliates of VOLAGS which often rely on community networks of volunteers to assist in 
resettlement. To a certain extent, the presence of religious organizations or religious residents 
may facilitate successful placement of refugees within the state because VOLAGS often rely on 
local volunteers to assist in refugees in providing support such as language services and 
acculturation. Third, refugees are placed and resettled in localities that have immigrants from the 
same or similar ethnic groups to allow greater integration. Fourth, state politics and political 
culture determines openness to new programs such as refugee resettlement programs that may 
contribute to the common good. Political culture affects refugee resettlement due to its influence 
on local state capacities (Mead, 2014). Moralistic and more politically liberal states may be more 
welcoming of refugees and may thus experience greater resettlements of refugees than non-
Moralistic states or more conservative states.  
Based on the review of existing literature we propose a theory of state refugee 
resettlement.   A state’s capacity to resettle refugees (i.e. the strength of its local support system) 
is influenced by how hospitable that state is to refugees.  In other words, the more hospitable a 
state is to refugee resettlement the greater the local support system will be for refugee 
resettlement.  Hospitableness to refugee resettlement is determined by various political, 
economic, and social factors.  Table 1 identifies the relevant characteristics of what we call 
“hospitable” states and “inhospitable.”  Hospitable states are those who are most welcome to 
refugee resettlement and inhospitable states are those who are the least welcome.  These are ideal 
types so no actual state may meet all the criteria for each category but rather some states will be 
closer to one pole than other states.  The criteria which define hospitable and inhospitable states 
are political – partisanship, ideology, and political culture; economic – wages, housing, quality 
of life, employment opportunities, and poverty rate; and social – level of volunteerism in a state, 
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and level of religious adherents in a state.  This latter category is included because many of the 
VOLAGS are religious based organizations and their local affiliates rely of their congregants to 
volunteer to support their resettlement operations.    
(Table 1 Here) 
Based on this theory we propose the following hypothesis to test regarding refugee 
resettlement in the 50 states: 
 H1: More liberal states will resettle more refugees than more conservative states 
 H2: More Democratic states will resettle more refugees than more Republican  
  states 
 H3: States with a moralistic political culture will resettle more refugees than states 
  without a moralistic political culture 
 H4: States with higher wages will resettle more refugees than states with lower  
  wages 
 H5: States with less expensive housing will resettle more refugees than states with 
  more expensive housing 
 H6: States with a higher quality of life will resettle more refugees than states with  
  a lower quality of life 
 H7: States with more employment opportunities will resettle more refugees than  
  states with low employment opportunities 
 H8: States with lower levels of poverty will resettle more refugees than states  
  with higher levels of poverty 
 H9: States with high levels of volunteerism will resettle more refugees than states  
  with low levels of volunteerism 
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 H10: States with more religious adherents will resettle more refugees than states  
  with fewer religious adherents 
 
A review of existing literature on refugee resettlement reveals the lack of empirical 
studies that statistically analyze the patterns of refugee resettlement among states. There are few 
studies, if at all, that conduct statistical analysis of the state characteristics that determine refugee 
placement in the U.S. states. Mott (2010) conducted a qualitative analysis of refugee interviews 
to determine factors affecting resettlement patterns. Several studies examine geospatial patterns 
of refugee resettlement (Brown, Mott, & Malecki; Forrest & Brown, 2014) while two studies by 
Darrow conducted qualitative ethnography on local affiliates of VOLAGS (2015a, 2015b). This 
study contributes to existing literature by conducting a statistical analysis of state characteristics 
that determine refugee placement and resettlement in the U.S. The study examines the extent to 
which political factors (e.g. ideology, partisanship, and political culture), economic factors (e.g. 
wages, housing, quality of life, employment opportunities, and poverty rate), and social factors 
(e.g. level of volunteerism and number of religious adherents) influence refugee resettlement 
within the U.S. states. 
DATA AND METHODS 
 To test the above hypotheses, we utilize state level data from 2002 to 2010.  We include 
data for all 50 states over this time period which leaves us with 450 total observations.   
Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from analysis beyond 2010 so we cannot capture the 
recent anti-refugee sentiment that has appeared in the states since 2015.  However, the time 
period included in this study is sufficient enough to analyze refugee resettlement patterns across 
the 50 states and within states as the political, economic, and social factors within states change. 
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 We estimate our models using pooled cross-sectional time series regression with panel 
corrected standard errors and a lagged dependent variable. The concern with time series cross 
sectional data is heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (both contemporaneously and serial). 
Panel corrected standard errors allow for errors that are heteroskedastic and correlated across 
panels (Beck and Katz 1995).  To address potential serial correlation a lagged dependent variable 
is included.  This makes for a more conservative test because the lag usually accounts for a 
significant amount of the variation (Smith 2004).  This variable will also have substantive use in 
this analysis as well because previous research suggests that once an area has been established as 
a place for resettlement VOLAGS continue to place refugees there, however, those number 
decline over time (Beaman 2012).  Finally, because the number of refugees resettled in the U.S. 
as a whole fluctuates significantly each year based on a variety of factors year dummy variables 
are included in the model.  Darrow (2015a) describes the multitude of factors that determine the 
overall number of refugees admitted to the U.S. year to year.  She claims that the “final number 
of refugees in any given year is determined by a range of factors, including the presence of 
conflicts around the globe that produce refugees, travel delays because of safety concerns or 
other processing issues with the government institutions involved in admissions procedures, 
foreign policy and the strategic use of resettlement, and domestic politics, which are affected by 
tensions between restrictionists and advocates.” (Darrow 2015a, p. 93) 
Dependent Variable 
 Our dependent variable is number of refugees resettled per 100,000 people in each state.  
The variable was constructed by dividing the total number of refugees resettled in a state by its 
population and multiplying that number by 100,000. The refugee data were taken from the Office 
of Refugee Resettlement’s annual reports to Congress.  We utilized the total refugees resettled 
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per state per 100,000 people variable over simply just using the total number of refugees 
resettled per state because such a variable controls for the large variation in state populations 
across the 50 states.  Figure 1. presents the number of refugees per 100,000 people per state from 
2002 to 2010.  In the years under observation here, Minnesota had the single highest number of 
refugees resettled per 100,000 people with 124 in 2005.  Wyoming, which has no state 
resettlement operation, did not resettle any refugees in this time period.  
(Figure 1 Here) 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 Our independent variables are divided into three categories – political factors, economic 
factors, and social factors.  With regards to political factors we have three variables: Ideology, 
Democratic Governor, and Political Culture.  Ideology is measured using the revised 1960-2013 
citizen ideology measure created by Barry et. al. (1998).  The measure is 0 to 100 with higher 
scores indicating a more liberal ideology.  Democratic Governor is measured as partisan control 
of the executive branch and is a dichotomous variable with 1 = the governor is a Democrat and 0 
= the governor is not a Democrat.  The assumption behind including these measures is that more 
liberal states (as measured by citizen ideology and Democratic control of the executive branch) 
will be more supportive of resettling refugees in their states.  Our variable for Political Culture is 
dichotomous with a 1 for moralistic states and 0 for individualistic and traditionalistic states.  We 
create a dichotomous variable as opposed to keeping the original three categories developed by 
Elazar (1984) because a preliminary means test suggested a large difference between moralistic 
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states on the one hand and traditional and individualistic states on the other in terms of the 
average number of refugees resettled in those states.     
 With regards to economic factors we have five variables – Wages, Housing, Quality of 
Life, Unemployment Rate, and Poverty Rate.  All of these measures indicate whether a state has 
the economic capacity to successfully resettle and integrate large numbers of refugees.  Our 
measure of Wages is the state’s minimum wage.  We focus on minimum wage as minimum wage 
jobs are most likely to be the types of jobs newly resettled refugees will be competitive for.  
Additionally, the ethos of the federal refugee resettlement program is for refugees to achieve 
self-sufficiency shortly after they arrive in the U.S. and states that offer a higher minimum wage 
might make a more enticing situation for VOLAGS to resettle refugees in and help them achieve 
self-sufficiency sooner.  State minimum wage data comes from the University of Kentucky’s 
Center for Poverty Research (2017).  The Housing variable is an index using sales prices and 
appraisal data and is the average of four quarterly measures per year.  The housing data is taken 
from Carl Klarner’s “State Economic Data” dataset (2013).  The state Quality of Life variable 
aggregates 19 economic indices into one ranking (1-50).  We include this as a broad economic 
measure of state hospitableness to refugee resettlement since the primary objective of the 
resettlement process is economic self-sufficiency for refugees as soon as possible.  The rankings 
have been inverted to ease interpretation.  The ranking was constructed by the website 
Ballotpedia and the data comes from the Correlates of State Policy dataset (Pallay 2013; Jordan 
& Grossman 2017).  Finally, the Unemployment Rate is the percentage of a state’s population 
that is unemployed, and the Poverty Rate is calculated as the percentage of a state’s population 
that lives in poverty. The data for both of these variables also comes from the University of 
Kentucky’s Center for Poverty Research (2017).     
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 We include four variables for the social factors category – Volunteerism, Mainline 
Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish.  Volunteerism is a composite measure of a state’s volunteer 
rate which is the percentage of the state population that volunteers and the volunteer hours per 
capita which is the average number of hours someone volunteers in that state per capita.  Our 
volunteerism measure is constructed by multiplying these two numbers.  The volunteering data 
comes from the Corporation for National and Community Service (2018)     
 Our reason for including variables on religious composition of a state is that since the 
refugee resettlement process in the U.S. is primarily driven by voluntary organizations many of 
which are religious based we can assume that these organizations utilize local congregations for 
volunteers and support for the resettlement of refugees.  Therefore, we include variables for the 
number of mainline Protestants in a state, the number of Catholics in a state, and the number of 
Jews in a state.  We specifically focus on these three religious groups because they align with the 
religious missions of six of the nine VOLAGS responsible for the resettlement of refugees in the 
states.  Church World Service (CWS), Episcopal Migration Ministries (EMM), World Relief 
Corporation (WR), and Lutheran Social Services are all Protestant organizations.  We include the 
measure of the number of mainline Protestants in a state to capture the potential volunteers who 
may work with organizations to help resettle refugees in their state.  The U.S. Conference of 
Catholic Bishops (USCCB) is a Catholic organization so we include the measure of Catholic 
adherents in a state to capture potential volunteers for this organization.  The Hebrew 
Immigration Aid Society (HIAS) is a Jewish organization and therefore we include a measure of 
Jewish adherents in a state to account for potential volunteers for this organization and its 
subsidiaries.  For the three religious adherents’ variables, we utilize the Religious Congregations 
and Membership Study from 2000 and 2010: (1) the measure of Mainline Protestants is the 
21 
 
number of mainline Protestants per state per 1,000 people; (2) the measure of Catholics is the 
number of Catholics per state per 1,000 people; and, (3) the measure of Jewish is the number of 
Jews per state per 1,000 people (Jones et. al. 2002; Grammich 2012). The Religious 
Congregations and Membership Study is conducted once every ten years in conjunction with the 
census therefore we only have data on religious adherents for 2000 and 2010.  To fill in the 
missing data we utilize linear interpolation. 
 Finally, we also include a control variable on the type of state refugee program a state 
runs in conjunction with the Federal government.  The idea is that states with their own 
government run resettlement operation maybe more open to resettlement than states with no 
program or a privately-run program.  Refugee Program Administration is a nominal variable with 
four categories.  0 is for states with no refugee resettlement program (which only includes the 
state of Wyoming), states that operate a Wilson Fish program are coded as 1, states that operate a 
public private partnership are coded as 2, and states that have their own state government run 
refugee resettlement operation are coded as 3.  Table 2. presents the summary statistics for each 
of our variables.   
(Table 2 Here) 
 
RESULTS 
 The results are presented in Table 3.  As expected the lagged dependent variable is a 
strong predictor of state refugee resettlement at time t.  This shows that even with the wide 
fluctuation in the total number of refugees resettled each year this does not change the pattern of 
resettlement in the states.   As for the other results, there is mixed support for our hypothesis.  
Starting with the political factors, on the one hand, we have clear support for our hypothesis that 
states with a moralistic political culture will resettle more refugees than states with 
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individualistic or traditionalistic political culture.   The coefficient is strongly positive and 
significant8.  The ethos of the moralistic political culture that “we are all in this together” extends 
to the plight of refugees as well.  On the other hand, our additional political variables did not 
confirm our hypothesis.  The signs for both Ideology and Democratic Governor were in the 
opposite direction from what was hypothesized and Ideology was significant at the .05 level.  
What this indicates is that more conservative states rather than more liberal states resettled more 
refugees.  This stands in stark contrast to the rhetoric and policy action undertaken by 
Republican governors in response to the possible resettlement of Syrian refugees in 2016.   
(Table 3 Here) 
 For the variables encompassing economic factors only Quality of Life and Poverty Rate 
were statistically significant, however the sign for Poverty Rate was not in the hypothesized 
direction.  A positive sign for Poverty Rate and statistical significance for both variables seems 
contradictory since a high quality of life seems inversely related to the poverty rate in a state 
however both are predictors of more refugee resettlement in a state.  A possible explanation for 
the Poverty Rate results could be that the level of poverty in a state is related to the cost of living 
and perhaps more refugees are resettled in those states because the cost of living is lower.  None 
of the other economic factor variables were statistically significant but the Wages variable and 
the Unemployment Rate variable were in the hypothesized direction while the Housing variable 
was not.   
 None of the social factor variables – Volunteerism, Mainline Protestant, Catholic, and 
Jewish were significant. Additionally, the coefficients for each, with the exception of the Jewish 
variable, were very small indicating they provide little to no explanation for the distribution of 
                                                          
8 We use the traditional p values as indicators of statistical significance even though there are questions regarding 
their utility in studies where state level analysis is concerned (Gill 2001). 
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refugees across the states.  Perhaps more fine grain analysis needs to be conducted in this area 
and one possible extension could be breaking apart the Mainline Protestant variable into specific 
denominations to see how that might influence the results.  Another extension could be to 
examine the number of religious congregations in a state as opposed to the number of adherents 
to any particular faith since it is usually the religious congregations that motivate volunteers. 
 Finally, our results for the Refugee Program Administration variable shows that states 
with no refugee resettlement program resettle far fewer refugees that states with a state run 
refugee resettlement program (the comparison category).  However, only Wyoming does not 
have any type of refugee resettlement program and therefore resettles almost no refugees.  The 
other 49 states have either a state administered program (which served as the base level 
comparison category for our analysis), a public private system, and/or a Wilson Fish program 
which allows for non-governmental agencies to implement the resettlement of refugees in a state.  
It is interesting that the signs for Wilson Fish and Public/Private are positive indicating those 
states resettle more refugees than states with a state administered program but the results are not 
statistically significant. 
CONCLUSION 
 In summary, we found mixed support for our hypothesis.  The political culture of a state 
appears to have a strong impact on the number of refugees that are resettled in each state with 
moralistic states resettling more refugees than non-moralistic states.  However, the ideology of 
the state in determining the number of refugees resettled was opposite of our expectations with 
conservative states resettling more refugees.  Further work is needed therefore to investigate the 
more precise role state level ideology and partisanship plays in determining the number of 
refugees resettled in a state.  Economic factors also produced mixed results with states with a 
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higher quality of life but also with higher poverty rates resettling more refugees. With regards to 
social factors, the variable measuring the level of volunteerism in a state was not significant nor 
were the variables measuring the levels of religious adherents in a state.  Based on the mixed 
support for our hypothesis we can also only offer mixed support for our theory of state refugee 
resettlement which is the more hospitable a state the more refugees will be resettled in that state.  
Conflicting support for our political and economic factor hypotheses and no support for our 
social factor hypotheses show that more refinement of the theory and/or more data is necessary 
to provide further support for our theory.  The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in our 
model is necessary for the statistical challenges represented when using pooled cross-sectional 
time series data, but it also provides for a very conservative test of our hypothesis since the lag 
accounts for a large amount of the variation in the dependent variable (Smith 2004).   
 Future research on the determinants of state level refugee resettlement in the U.S. should 
work to tease out more of the role that political, economic, and social factors play in refugee 
resettlement.  Future research should also examine how previous refugee resettlement in a state 
effects future resettlement.  By including a lag of the dependent variable in our study we capture 
some of this effect but it would be fruitful to see whether refugees from specific countries tend to 
be resettled in certain states and if that is a determinant for future refugees from those countries 
to also be resettled in those states.  One of the principles the VOLAGS try to operate on is family 
reunification.  Although this does not constitute a majority of refugee resettlement it could prove 
to influence the distribution of refugees within the U.S. states. 
   The patterns of refugee resettlement within the U.S. is an understudied phenomenon.  
This is unfortunate because it is an issue which cuts across a variety of disciplines.  There is also 
a heavy normative component to this research since whether a country like the U.S. should 
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accept refugees, and how many, is a both a legal and normative issue and is often presented as 
such.  But there is also a strong political component to how and where refugees are resettled that 
also needs to be considered when trying to understand this topic which makes it a ripe area of 
study.   
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Table 1. Theory of State Refugee Resettlement – Hospitable States and Inhospitable States 
 Hospitable States Inhospitable States 
Political 
Liberal Conservative 
Democratic Republican 
Moralistic Non-Moralistic 
Economic 
High Wages Low Wages 
Affordable Housing Expensive Housing 
Good Quality of Life Poor Quality of Life 
Employment Opportunities Lack of Employment Opportunities 
Low Poverty High Poverty 
Social 
High Volunteerism Low Volunteerism 
High Religion Low Religion 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Refugees per 100,000 450 18.76 19.57 0 124.53 
Refugees per 100,000t-1 450 18.84 19.66 0 123.6 
Ideology 450 53.32 15.85 8.45 95.97 
Democratic Governor 450 0.513 0.5 0 1 
Political Culture 450 0.34 0.474 0 1 
Wages 450 6.12 1.11 2.65 8.55 
Housing 450 3.3 1.09 1.6 7.14 
Quality of Life 450 25.37 14.43 1 50 
Unemployment Rate 450 5.81 2.03 2.6 13.7 
Poverty Rate 450 12.32 3.17 5.4 23.1 
Volunteerism 450 11.84 5.74 2.62 45.42 
Mainline Protestant 450 95.1 60.59 8.52 335.5 
Catholic 450 180.04 111.48 32.78 502.46 
Jewish 450 7.96 11.13 0.23 77.81 
Ref. Program Admin 450 2.42 0.89 0 3 
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Table 3. Determinants of State Refugee Resettlement, 2002-2010 
Variable       Model 1 
Refugees per 100,000t-1   .821*** 
     (.085) 
Ideology   -.064* 
     (.031) 
Democratic Governor   -1.10 
     (.772) 
Political Culture   2.17* 
     (.954) 
Wages   .940 
     (.518) 
Housing   .258 
     (.606) 
Quality of Life   .114** 
     (.043) 
Unemployment Rate   -.745 
     (.421) 
Poverty Rate   .439* 
     (.178) 
Volunteerism    .021 
     (.094) 
Mainline Protestant   -.002 
     (.010) 
Catholic   -.004 
     (.004) 
Jewish   .049 
     (.040) 
No State Program   -3.74* 
     (1.69) 
Wilson Fish   1.51 
     (1.10) 
Public/Private   .399 
        (2.45) 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; Panel Corrected Standard Errors in Parentheses 
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Figure 1. Number of Refugees per 100,000 People per State, 2002-2010 
 
 
